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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.
Did the the trial judge err in determining that the evidence
presented at trial required a directed verdict as to the issue of
the existence of a contract between the parties to settle the
lawsuit filed by Defendant in the Murray Circuit Court; and
determining that the Defendant breeched that settlement agreement.
II.
Did the trial judge err in instructing the jury with regard
to the basis for awarding punitive deimages on the claim for abuse
of process.
III.
Is the award of punitive damages reasonable under the
standards enumerated by this court.
IV.
Did the trial court err in denying Defendant's motion for
remitittur on the issue of punitive damages.

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Richard H. VanDyke, the Plaintiff in the trial court is the
Respondent on appeal.

Mountain Coin Machine Distributors, Inc.

was the Defendant in the trial court and is the Appellant.

All

references to the parties shall be as Plaintiff and Defendant.
References to the record refer to the transcript of the trial held
on July 10th and 11th, 1986 and shall be by page and line number.
Plaintiff owns a restaurant and an amusement game business (T4,2).

Defendant is a corporation which sells video game equipment

(T-4 # 13).

In 1983 Plaintiff became interested in the purchase of

a certain piece of equipment, a Mach I laser disc game (T-4,21).
Plaintiff contacted the Defendant and made some initial inquiry as
to this piece of equipment (T-5,5).

Ultimately Plaintiff took

possession of the equipment and signed a delivery receipt,
acknowledging that he had taken possession (T-6.1C»).

After

several weeks Plaintiff determined that he was uot making enough
revenue from the game to make it profitable to ke«p the equipment.
He contacted the Defendant and indicated that he
the game.

Defendant's agent indicated that it wat

of the company to accept returns.

nted to return
he not policy

Plaintiff believing that it was

indeed the policy of the company to accept returns, indicated that
he would send the equipment back to Defendant (T-7,22).

Plaintiff

attempted to return the equipment; but Defendant refused to accept
delivery(T-9,19).

Plaintiff then told the agent of Defendant that
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he would not pay for the equipment and that Defendant could pick
it up at his convenience (T-9,23).

Defendant did not pick up the

equipment; and ultimately filed suit against Plaintiff in the
Murray Circuit Court for the purchase price of the equipment (T10,17).

Upon being served with a summons and complaint, Plaintiff

contacted the agent of Defendant and inquired what could be done
to resolve the lawsuit (T-10,23).

Defendant's agent told

Plaintiff that if he would sign an installment agreement and make
a down payment of $500.00 the lawsuit would be resolved (I'll, 10).

Plaintiff signed the contract and returned it to

Defendant with a check for $500.00 (T-12,9).
dated February 27, 1984.

The contract is

Defendant's records indicate that the

contract was received back by Defendant at least by March 15, 1984
(T-80,10).

At about the same time as the company acknowledges

receiving the contract, Defendant's attorney submitted a default
and default judgment to the court.

In addition he submitted an

abstract of judgment and a motion and order to show cause in
supplemental proceedings (T-88,6).
under the contract (T-13,15).

Plaintiff began making payment

On May 1, 1984 Plaintiff was served

with the motion and order in supplemental proceedings.
was dated for Plaintiff to appear on May 10, 1984.

The order

Upon receiving

the order Plaintiff contacted Mr. Symes and inquired what was
going on.

Plaintiff testified that during this conversation he

told Mr. Symes that he had signed the contract and sent the check
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for the down payment; and asked Mr. Symes why the suit was still
be pursued.

Mr. Symes told Plaintiff that indeed the check and

contract had been received and that he would not have to appear at
the court hearing.

Plaintiff requested that the attorney for

Defendant contact him and confirm that he did not have to appear
(T-14,1).

Mr. Kingston did in fact call Plaintiff and did confirm

that the matter had been taken care of and that Plaintiff would
not have to appear.

Plaintiff testified that during his

conversation with Mr. Kingston, he informed him that the contract
had been signed and that the down payment had been sent (T-15,21).
Mr. Kingston acknowledges that at approximately the time he was
preparing the default, he spoke to Mr. Symes and learned of the
conversation regarding the signing of the contract and that the
contract had been sent to Plaintiff (T-95,15).
appear at the hearing on May 10, 1984.

Plaintiff did not

In December of 1984

Plaintiff went to his bank to obtain some refinancing of some
short term notes.

The loan was to be secured by his residence and

be for a term of seven years.

The loan was to be non-commercial.

At this time the bank obtained a title report on the Plaintiff's
home.

The report showed the outstanding judgment in the Murray

Circuit Court which had been docketed in Box Elder District Court
by Mr. Kingston on April 16, 1984.

Based on this judgment the

bank was not able to make Plaintiff the long term loan that he
wanted (T-53,7) .

Plaintiff informed the bank that the judgment
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was not supposed to be there and that he would check with the
attorney for Defendant and get back to them.

Plaintiff called Mr.

Kingston and informed him of what had happened with the bank and
asked why the judgment was on his property.

Mr Kingston told

Plaintiff that he would check into the matter and let Plaintiff
know (T-16,19).

A few days later Plaintiff received a letter from

Mr. Kingston stating that he had checked into the matter and found
that Plaintiff was not current under the payment schedule called
for in the contract and that there was a parts account which also
needed to be paid.

Mr. Kingston stated that due to these facts he

could not release the lien (Exhibit No. 3 ) . Thereafter Mr.
Kingston initiated a second motion and order in supplemental
proceedings against Plaintiff and had he served with an order to
appear in the Murray Circuit Court.

The motion and order

indicated that the full amount of the judgment was still
unsatisfied (T-18,25).

Plaintiff then contacted a lawyer and had

the lawyer contact Mr. Kingston.

This attorney wrote Mr.

Kingston and informed him that Plaintiff had signed an installment
contract with Defendant which would have been an accord and
satisfaction of the original debt (T-19,16) (Exhibit No. 5 ) .
Plaintiff's attorney prepared a stipulation and order setting
aside the judgment in the Murray Circuit Court and set it to Mr.
Kingston (T-100,12).

The judgment was set aside on the docket of

the First District Court on June 19# 1985 (T-29,8).
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Plaintiff

ultimately obtained the long term financing, although in the
interim he was required to roll over the short term notes several
times and had to provide the bank with certain information and
documentation that was not origianlly required (T-56,5).
Plaintiff brought suit for abuse of process and breech of
contract.

Defendant counterclaimed for the balance owed on the

installment contract and on the open account.

The trial court,

sitting with a jury, awarded Plaintiff $250.00 in actual dciages,
the amount that Plaintiff paid his attorney to get the judgment
set aside, and $37,000.00 in punitive damages.

The court gave

Defendant an offset for the amount owed on the balance of the
installment contract and open account (Judgment on Jury Verdict).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court did not err in determining that a contract
existed between the parties for the settlement of the Murrciy
Circuit Court lawsuit.

The evidence is undisputed that Plaintiff

had a conversation with the employee of Defendant, Mr. Symes with
regard to resolving the suit.

The evidence is undisputed that the

Plaintiff signed the installment contract and sent it to Defendant
along with a $500.00 down payment.

Viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to Defendant it is undisputed that the
contract and down payment were received by Defendant at least by
the 15t; of March, 1984, which is prior to the date that the
judgment by default was entered and the abstract of that judgment
6

sent to Box Elder District Court.

The evidence is also undisputed

that the Defendant accepted installment payments from Plaintiff
after receiving the contract.

Defendant also counterclaimed

against Plaintiff for the balance due on the installment contract.
A reasonable juror could not find that a contract did not exist
between the parties to resolve or settle the Murray Circuit
lawsuit; and that Defendant breeched that agreement.
The instruction of the trial judge with respect to the
finding required to support an award of punitive damages was
correct.

The trial judge in instruction number 9 gave the jury

the appropriate instruction with respect to the basis for awarding
punitive damages.
instruction.

Interrogatory No. 3 also is an appropriate

The judge instructed the jury that it must find that

the Defendant intentionally abused the civil process with the
intent to cause the Plaintiff stress or pain; or to gain an unfair
advantage over the Plaintiff.

This instruction is consistent with

this court's holdings that punitive damages may only be awarded in
cases involving malice or reckless indifference for the rights of
another.

The use of the civil process for the purpose of

inflicting pain or stress; or for gaining an unfair creditor's
advantage is equatable to malice; or reckless disregard for the
rights of another.

Further, Defendant made no objection to

interrogatory No. 3 at the time of trial.

Lastly, even if the

judge did not properly instruct the jury with respect to abuse of
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process, the award of punitive damages could stand on the
malicious breech of contract alone.
The award of punitive damages in this case is appropriate
under the factors enumerated by this court, ie., the nature of the
conduct, the relative wealth of the Defendant, the effect on the
life of the Plaintiff and the possibility of a recurrence.
Further this award serves the purposes for which punitive damages
are designed, ie. to punish this wrongdoer, to prevent the
Defendant or others from similar conduct in the future and to
remove the profit to Defendant of this type of conduct.
The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for
remitittur on the issue of punitive damages.

The court found that

under the particular facts of this case the the award of punitive
daraages was justified; and that the amount of the award serves the
intended purpose of punishing the Defendant, removing the profit
to Defendant of this type of activity and deterring the Defendant
and others from similar conduct in the future.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial judge did not err in determining that the evidence
presented at trial required a directed verdict on the issue of the
existence of a settlement agreement and the fact that Defendant
breeched that agreement.
Defendant contends tha

the court should have allowed the
8

jury to decide if an agreement existed betv/een the parties wherein
the Plaintiff agreed to sign an installment contract, make a down
payment of $500.00 and thereafter make regular monthly payments;
and wherein the Defendant agreed to abandon the Murray Circuit
Court action.

The court determined that the contract existed and

that neither party had abandoned the contract.

As a result the

court ordered the jury to award Plaintiff the damages that it
found he had suffered by the preponderance of the evidence, if
any (Interrogatory No. I ) . The court further determined that
Defendant was also entitled to damages for the unpaid balance of
the installment contract and open accounts sought on counterclaim
(Judgment on Jury Verdict).
The evidence supports the trial court's determination that
reasonable jurors could not disagree over the existence of this
contract and the fact that Defendant breeched this agreement. The
undisputed evidence is that after being served with a summons and
complaint, the Plaintiff called the Defendant's agent, Merlin
Symes, and inquired, in the words of Mr. Symes, what could be done
to resolve the lawsuit (T-79,17).

Mr. Symes told the Plaintiff

that if he would sign an installment contract that would resolve
the lawsuit.

The evidence is undisputed that the Plaintiff signed

the installment contract and sent it to Defendant with the $500.00
down payment.

Even Defendant's own records indicate that the

signed contract was in their possession by no later than March 15,
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1984 (T-80,6).

The testimony of the then attorney for Defendant

is that on or about the 14th of March he submitted to the court,
the default judgment, motion and order in supplemental proceedings
and abstract of judgment (T-88,9).

The record is clear, however,

that the judgment was not signed before March 20, 1984 (T-105,19)
(Exhibit 17). The motion and order in supplemental proceeding was
not served on the Plaintiff until May 1, 1984 (T-14,17).

The date

of docket of the abstract of judgment in the First District Court
is April 13, 1984 (T-29,4).

All of these events took place after

the Defendant admittedly had the installment contract in hand.
Had the Defendant been so inclined, it could have easily stopped
the judgment from being entered, the motion and order in
supplemental proceedings from being issued and the abstract of
judgment from being entered in the First District Court.

Whether

the failure of Defendant was intentional or unintentional, it
constituted a breech of what Defendant agreed to do, ie. resolve
the lawsuit.
It is also undisputed that the Defendant accepted the down
payment from Plaintiff, accepted his regular monthly payments
and filed a counterclaim seeking the balance of the installment
contract.

The Defendant was in fact given an offset for the

balance of the installment contract.

Clearly, reasonable minds

could find nothing other than the trial judge did, ie. that the
contract existed and that the Defendant breeched that contract.
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POINT II
The trial judge did not err in instructing the jury with
regard to awarding punitive damages for abuse of process.
The judge instructed the jury that it must find that the
Defendant intentionally abused the civil process with the intent
to cause the Plaintiff stress or pain; or to gain an unfair
advantage over the Plaintiff.

This instruction is consistent with

this court's holdings that punitive damages may only be awarded in
cases involving malice or reckless indifference for the rights of
another.

In the case of Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc.,

675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), this court stated "Our cases have
generally held that punitive damages may be awarded only on proof
of "willful and malicious" conduct, or on proof of conduct which
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and
disregard of the rights of others..."
Defendant urges that the judge should have required the jury
to find "actual malice" as this court required in McFarland v.
Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).

While it is

clear that the holding in this case refers only to claims for
false arrest, the instruction of the judge in Interrogatory No.
Ill is consistent with the definition of "actual malice", ie. done
with the intent of to cause stress or pain.

The reckless

indifference standard as set forth in Behrens, is likewise
consistent with the judge's instruction with regard to the intent
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to gain an unfair advantage.

If Defendant acted to gain an unfair

advantage over Plaintiff, then Defendant acted with knowing and
reckless indifference toward the rights of Plaintiff.

In the

explanation to Interrogatory No. Ill, the court was merely
tailoring the reckless indifference standard to the facts this
particular case and the claim of abuse of process.
The explanation in Interrogatory No. Ill, coupled with
Instruction No. 9, adequately and properly instructed the jury
with regard to awarding punitive damages for abuse of process.
Further, the Defendant raised no objection to Interrogatory III
at the time of trial (T-128,4).

Lastly, the jury's award of

punitive damages can be based either on the claim of breech of
contract or the claim of abuse of process (Interrogatory No. IV).
POINT III
The award of punitive damages is reasonable under the fcictors
enumerated by this court and serves the purpose for which punitive
damages were intended.
In Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984)
this court stated "Some factors that should have been considered
by both the jury and the trial judge in determining the amount of
the award are: the relative wealth of the defendant, the nature of
his alleged misconduct, the facts and circumstances surrounding
such misconduct, the effect thereof upon the lives of plaintiff
and others, the probability of future recurrence of the
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misconduct, the relationship between the parties, and the amount
of actual damages awarded".

See also Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d

723 (Utah 1983), First Security Bank v^ J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P.2d
591 (Utah 1982) and Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile
Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).

Clearly the major area of

concern in this case is the amount of punitive damages in
comparison to the award of actual damages; yet determining the
reasonableness of an award cannot be just a question of comparing
the actual damages to the punitive damages.

It would seem from

the factors enumerated by the court in Bundy, that other
circumstances may dictate that the award of punitive damages be
substantially higher the the award of actual damages.

If it is

true that the facts of a particular case may support such a
disproportionate award, then this is such a case.

In this case

the undisputed evidence presented at trial is that the Defendant
corporation has assets worth in excess of a million and a quarter
dollars (Exhibit 15). With such resources the Defendant could
easily absorb the actual damages and even a lesser amount of
punitive damages and still feel no sting.

Punitive damages which

are not a punishment to this Defendant, because of its wealth, are
not punitive at all and do not serve their purpose.

In Bundy, the

court overturned a disproportionate award of punitive damages; but
in that case there was no evidence of wealth at all let alone such
wealth as the Defendant has in this case.
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It is appropriate that several of the factors set forth above
deal with the conduct of the wrongdoer.

It would be an

appropriate paraphrase to say that the jury should make the
punishment fit the crime.

In this case the defendant acting in

large part through its attorney, a person who presumably is
charged with a high standard of conduct, allowed a default
judgment to stay of record knowing that the same had been
satisfied by a settlement agreement between the parties. Further
this attorney allowed an abstract of that judgment to stay of
record in t

First District Court when he knew that the

underlying judgment should not have been entered.

This attorney

later refused to remove the judgment lien when requested to do so
by the Plaintiff; and he used the existence of this judgment to
attempt to collect payment of not only the installment contract
but a seperate account as well.

And finally this attorney had the

Plaintiff served with a supplemental order.

An attorney, such as

Mr. Kingston, clearly understands the civil process and the effect
that his actions would have on Pi iintiff.

He understood that by

allowing the judgment to stay of record in the First District
Court he was allowing a lien to stay on Plaintiff's real property.
Mr. Kingston was informed by Plaintiff that the existence of this
lien was interfering with a loan transaction that the Plaintiff
was attempting to consummate with his bank.

Faced with this

knowledge Mr. Kingston not only refused to release the lien; but
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told Plaintiff that he would not do so until the installment
contract and a seperate open account were paid*

Mr. Kingston knew

that the judgment in the Murray Circuit Court should have been set
aside; and yet he continued to use the pressure of this judgment
to intimidate Plaintiff when he had him served with a second
supplemental order-

The conduct of the Defendant through its

employee and attorney is not just an isolated, single incident
motivated by some ill-informed idea of debt collection; but rather
was a ongoing series of actions by one who knew the consequences
of his actions and the effect they would have on Plaintiff.
The actions of Defendant in this case justify a larger award
of punitive damages compared to the actual damages.

It is also

important to note that the only reason the actual damages were not
considerably higher is that Plaintiff ultimately obtained the
longer term financing he was seeking.
The effect of Defendant's conduct upon Plaintiff is clear.
The Plaintiff was frustrated in his attempts to obtain financing.
It is clear that Defendant attempted to use the judgment to apply
pressure and stress on the Plaintiff.

It is clear from the

evidence that the existence of the judgment and lien cost the
Plaintiff time, the time it took to periodically renew loans and
to supply his bank with additional information.

It is clear from

the evidence, that the Plaintiff felt the anxiety of a laymen
dealing with the existence of a lien upon his home and with court
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orders being served upon him; and not completely understanding
what all of it meant.
There is a high degree of probability that the actions of the
Defendant will recur unless there is a substantial deterrent to
Defendant.

The Defendant is a company which deals on a daily

basis with people like Plaintiff.

Defendant had at the time of

trial, approximately $645,000.00 in accounts receivable.
is no substantial penalty placed

If there

Defendant for what it did to

Plaintiff, there is every likelihood that Defendant will continue
to use such tactics with other debtors.

And given the large

number of accounts held by the Defendant, a small award of
punitive damages in this case would not remove the profitability
to Defendant in such collection tactics.
POINT IV
The trial court did not err in denying Defendants motion for
remitittur.
Defendant made the argument to the court in a motion for
remitittur, that the disproportionate award of punitive damages
required that the court alter the jury verdict.

Plaintiff meide

the argument to the court that the factors set forth above
justified the award of punitive damages.

The trial court found

Plaintiff's argument to be persuasive and denied Defendant's
motion.

If this court accepts Plaintiff's argument that the facts

of this case justify the award c:

i-

mitive damag

en the trial

court did not err in doing so.
CONCLUSION
The court properly determined that the issue of the existence
of a settlement contract and the breech thereof by Defendant were
not factually in dispute.

The court also properly instructed the

jury with respect to punitive damages for abuse of process.

The

amount of punitive damages is justified in this case because of
the wealth of Defendant, the nature of Defendant's misconduct, the
effect that the conduct had on Plaintiff and the high degree of
probability that such conduct will recur.

The trial court did not

err in accepting Plaintiff's argument that the amount of the award
was justified.

The decision of the jury in the lower court should

be affirmed.
DATED this /y<J4\ day of February, 1987.

'•ri^frN

:hael W. Milxer
Attorney for
Plaintiff / Respondent
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INSTRUCTION NO.

I

Plaintiff has asked for an award of actual and punitive
damages against the Defendant based on Plaintiff's claims of
tortious interference with a business transaction and abuse of
process.
Actual or compensatory damages are those which compensate
an injured person for all injuries and losses sustained as a
result of another person's wrongful act.

On the other hand,

exemplary or punitive damages are those which serve to punish a
wrongdoer for his unlawful act and to deter the wrongdoer and
others from like conduct in the future.
If you find that the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of
actual damages and you further find that in doing the acts
complained of, the Defendant acted willfully, wantonly, or
maliciously, you may, but you are not required to, award the
Plaintiff exemplary or punitive damages in such a sum as would
in your opinion, punish the Defendant for its unlawful act and
deter it and others from committing like acts in the future.

-4-

INTERROGATORY NO, III
1.

DO YOU FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEES AND/OR LAWYER INTENTIONALLY
USED ILLEGALLY "ABUSED THE PROCESS" BY UNLAWFULLY FILING
OR ALLOWING AN INVALID JUDGMENT TO BE CONTINUED IN BOX
ELDER COUNTY TO GAIN AN ILLEGAL CREDITORS ADVANTAGE OF
A DEBTOR?
"YES"

^

"NO"
Explanation; The tort of "abuse of process" is present when
a person pretends to be using legal use of process for a purpose
but intentionally use it for a different purpose or to inflict
unnecessary stress or pain. An example may be when a creditor
refuses to remove a mortgage or lien in an attempt to force a
payment on a different debt. The plaintiff alleges that the
defendant's employees and/or lawyer has done that in this case.
The defendant denied this and asserts they made an honest mistake.
The issue is submitted to the jury.
The distinguishing between a "malicious breach of contract"
and "abuse of process" generally is that the "abuse of process"
that involves the use of court process where an intentional
breach of contract may or may not involve an abuse of process.
If the plaintiff proves an abuse of process the law permits the
award of punitive damages.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff on this issue.

. Miller
t Law
n
99
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BOX ELDEP COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD H. VANDYKE,
)

JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

)

Civil No. 19389

Plaintiff,
vs.
MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE
DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,
Defendant.
BE IT KNOWN that this matter having come on regularly for
trial on the 10th day of July, 1986; and the Plaintiff having been
present in person and represented by counsel, Michael L. Miller;
and the Defendant having been present by and through its agent and
represented by counsel, Dennis K. Poole; and the court, the
Honorable John F. Wahlquist District Judge presiding, having
empaneled a jury; and the parties having thereafter presented
evidence to the jury; and the court having determined that as a
matter of law, certain issues were not in dispute; and the jury
thereafter having retired to deliberate the issues remaining in
dispute; and having so deliberated having returned a special
verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarding Plaintiff $250.00 in
damages for breech of contract and $37,000.00 in punitive damages
for intentional and malicious breech of contract and and for abuse
of process; and the court having ordered that judgment be entered
on said special verdict, and that in said judgment, an offset be

given to Defendant for the sums due and owing Plaintiff on the
balance of the installment contract and the open account in the
amounts of $1493.98 and $775.93 respectively; now
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
Plaintiff, RICHARD H. VANDYKE, be and is hereby awarded judgment
against the Defendant, MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,
as follows:
1. $34,980.09 in compensation and punitive damages;
2. $357.74 in costs;
3. Interest on the total judgment at the lawful rate from the
date hereof until collected and costs of the court hereinafter
accruing.
DATED this

day of

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

John F. Wahlquist-District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT to Defendant's attorney,
postage prepaid, at:
DENNIS K. POOLE
Attorney at Law
Prowswood Plaza, Suite 306
4885 South 900 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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DATED t h i s

day of

, 1986-

784

Michael L. M i l l e r

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD H. VAN DYKE,

]

Plaintiff,

]i

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE
DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,

]
1

Case No.

19389

Defendant.

The defendant has made a motion for a new trial and/or
in the alternative for a reduction in the punitive damage award.
The Court here denies those motions.
When the Court considers a motion such as the one before
it,

it must

jury.

not

substitute

The Court

its

own

is not particularly

judgment

for

that

of

the

bothered by that rule in

this case, because the Court's own view is that there was good
reason to grant substantial punitive damages.

If the Court gives

due consideration to the jury's findings, it would find facts as
indicated below.
FACTS
1.

The plaintiff is a businessman in Brigham City, Box

Elder County.
has

a business

He conducts a restaurant business there, and also
that might

be

people play video games, etc.

called

an arcade, that

is where

The defendant is in the business
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of selling the coin machines to arcades.
interested

in a very

participated
aircraft.
ment

complicated

in general

The plaintiff became

machine, wherein

as though

the player

he was the pilot

of an

Plaintiff and defendant eventually reached an agree-

and

entered

into

a

contract

wherein

plaintiff

was

to

purchase the machine and pay a sum of monies on an installment
basis for it.
2.
plaintiff's
should.

The machine was delivered
premises.

The

machine

and

installed

performed

on the

exactly

as

it

The difficulty was that for some reason the teenagers,

or customers, were not attracted to the machine in sufficient
numbers that the continued placement of the machine on plaintiff's premises was economically justified.

Plaintiff attempted

to force the defendant to accept the return of the machine*

The

defendant stood on its rights and refused delivery, and informed
the plaintiff that he would be held to the contract.
3.

The

defendant

subsidiary corporation.

transferred

the

contract

to a

This corporation was a finance company.

In general the finance company took the position that it was a
bonafide purchase for value, and that they were not subject to
any defenses the plaintiff might assert in the nature of a right
to return the machine.

This frustrated

the plaintiff.

The

general situation suggests that this set up had been engineered
in part to frustrate persons such as the plaintiff, or persons in
the plaintiff's position.
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4.

The defendant

the contract.

filed suit against the plaintiff on

The parties eventually re-negotiated a settlement

that occurred between the plaintiff and one of the two corporations.

The payments were in part

delinquent

general were made pursuant to the contract.
tion continued
Lake Countyf

at

timesf

The other corpora-

the suit and secured a default judgment

in Murray Circuit Court.

by the defendant without

the

but in

in Salt

This default was entered

plaintiff's

knowledge, and was a

complete surprise to the plaintiff, because it occurred after it
settled.
5.

Plaintiff

contacted

the

defendant

corporation and

requested that they remove the judgment, inasmuch as the cause of
action under which the judgment was taken had been negotiated and
settled,

and

that,

therefore,

the

judgment

was

invalid.

The

judgment was filed in Box Elder County.
6.
informed
because

Eventually the defendant caused the plaintiff to be

by an attorney
the plaintiff

that the judgment would not be removed

owed a separate sum

account to the defendant.
was

an

judgment

abuse

of

removed.

The plaintiff took the view that this

process.

Plaintiff

of

attempted

to

have

the

It was terribly upsetting to him as he was

attempting to refinance his home.
dropped.

of money on an open

The general mortgage rates had

He believed he could not do so because of the existence

a judgment

respect failed.

against

him.

His

evidence

of

damages

in

this

The bank indicated that they probably would have
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rewritten the plaintiff's contract at any time he desired them to
because

of

their

personal

acquaintance

and

respect

for

the

plaintiff, but that the rate of interest would not have dropped/
because

they

were

transactions, and

charging
this would

jury likely determined
for

a improper

1%

above

prime

on

all

commercial

be regarded as such a loan.

The

that the judgment was left on the books

purpose, and

that

it was done deliberately

knowingly by the attorney who served

both

corporations

and

and
the

business heads for each company.
7.
judgment

be

The plaintiff employed an attorney who requested the
removed.

He

later

charged

the

plaintiff

threaten suit if the judgment was not removed.

$250 to

After the threat

was made, time passed, and eventually the judgment was removed.
The plaintiff then filed this suit for abuse of process, to-wit:
the taking of an invalid

judgment

in Murray Circuit Court, and

the docketing of it in Box Elder County for an improper purpose,
and the refusal to remove it for an improper purpose.
8.
$250.

The

jury

awarded

actual

damages

in the amount of

This is exactly the sum claimed as attorney's fees paid by

the plaintiff to his lawyer to threaten suit and get the judgment
removed.
9.
received.

Some evidence as to the wealth of the defendant was
The usual instructions on punitive damages were given.

10.

The jury then awarded

$37,000 as and for punitive

damages as punishment against the parent company.
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ISSUE
There
discussions

are many

that

there

Utah

decisions

should

exist

in which

there

are

some relationship between

actual damages suffered and punitive damages awarded*

Some of

these judgments would suggest that punitive damages are excessive
when

they

suffered*

exceed

three

or

four

times

the

actual

damages

Most of the cases that take this approach are cases in

which there are no actual evidence as to the defendant's net
worth or as to its wealth.
which

shows that

There is in this case an exhibit

the defendants were prepared

to acknowledge

during discovery that the net worth of the parent corporation was
at

least

one and

one-half

million

dollars.

The

plaintiff's

attorney argued the case to the jury; that the abuse of process
was obvious and clear; and done by corporation counsel of the two
corporations; and also with full knowledge of the heads of the
defendant

corporation.

support this argument.

There

is

circumstantial

evidence

to

Plaintiff's counsel further argued to the

jury that to award a few hundred or a few thousand dollars in
this case as punitive damages would serve no useful purpose.

The

company could absorb such losses painlessly and continue to do
this type of a practice to enforce

collection of debt.

The

attorney further argued that if the debtor's rights are to be
enforced at all in a case like thisf there would have to be an
award of sufficient punitive damages that a debtor could afford
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to bring the lawsuit against them and also such a sum of money
that

it

would

remove

the

profits

which

a

corporationf

or

a

corporation with subsidiariesf might enjoy through misuse of this
collection device.
CONCLUSION
The Utah authorities/ and the federal authorities, have
been faced with this type of an issue before.

These authorities

consider the wealth of the defendant, its motive, and the amount
of

judgment

which

would

profit from continuing
situated.

be

necessary

to

remove

the practice by defendant

any

probable

and others so

It is the plaintiff's position that a judgment in the

amount here awarded is appropriate for those purposes.
This

particular

the Court has witnessed.
take

unjustified

litigation

resembles

other

litigations

At times creditors are in a position to

advantages

over

their

debtors.

There

are

penalties built into the Commercial

Code intending to stop this

type of practice.

action is not brought under

This particular

the Commercial Code.

It is brought appropriately under the tort

law for abuse of process.
should

and

measurement.

can

awarded,

is

not

capable

of

an

exact

In general, it would have to be a sufficient sum

that a defendant
corporations,

be

The amount of punitive damages, which

has

of

this size, that

attorneys

on

does

retainer,

its business
etc.,

would

through
find

unprofitable to do this type of thing to debtors in the future.

it
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The Court has considered what sum would be proper.

It

has considered sums of $10f000, $25,000, and the $37,000 award.
The

Court

recognizes

that

this

was

under the advise of an attorney.

deliberate

misconduct

done

The Court recognizes that the

defendant does a large retail business in its own name and an
undisclosed

amount

of

business

through

subsidiary

corporations.

The Court finds that it cannot, in its discretion, say that this
sum

is

animosity

excessive.
among

the

The

Court

jurors.

saw

The

no

Court

evidence
notes

of

that

anger
jurors

include persons of business experience and sophistication.
Court finds that it must respect the jurors' judgment.

-?1
DATED t h i s 'j?<± >dav of September, 1986.
^

/
//
/

.JOHN P . WAHLQUIST,

judge

f

or
did
The
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify
1986f

a

true

and

that on this

correct

copy

of

33>

the

day of September^

foregoing

Decision was served upon the following:
Michael L. Miller
Attorney for Plaintiff
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Dennis K. Poole
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH
Attorney for Defendant
4885 South 900 East, Suite 306
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 /"\

PAULA CARR, Secretary

Memorandum

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served four true and exact copies of
the foregoing brief on the Defendant by mailing the same to the
attorney for the Defendant, postage prepaid, at:
Mr. Dennis K. Poole
Ms. Marilynn P. Fineshriber
Poole, Cannon & Smith
4885 South 900 East, #306
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
DATED this _ / 7 K day of February, 1987.
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